

Issue 2 SHLAA

In Bath: Introduction

Since 2008 HFT have made representations concerning the integrity of the SHLAA evidence presented by the Council, namely in the “Call for Sites” 2008, both to the CSSO 2010 and to the dCS 2011. The lack of transparency by the Council in failing to disclose the evidence of the SHLAA in Autumn 2009, led to HFT having to lodge a Fol request in 2010 which resulted in a judgment against the Council and disclosure of information in July 2010.

The detail of our complaints about the SHLAA are set out in rep. HFT SHLAA 2011 which are repeated below, which goes to the heart of Issue 2: *“Is the spatial strategy for the delivery of housing and jobs justified and are there reasonable prospects for delivery consistent with national advice?”*.

This should be an evidence based Plan, where the results of the SHLAA evidence can be used by all parties to engage in this process on the basis that it represents the best evidence available and that it has the confidence of the public and industry at large.

HFT said in Feb 2011: ***“This document (SHLAA2010, CD4/H6) has been published only during the period of consultation into the CS i.e. December and has not been subjected to proper public scrutiny. As such, the evidence about the deliverability and the suitability of the sites is difficult to assess and to test its soundness:***

- ***given the short notice that has been given at this stage.***
- ***the lack of any proper involvement of key stakeholders in the process until now***
- ***the failure to follow any Practice Guidance published by CLG***
- ***The failure to set up a Stakeholder Panel as recommended***
- ***The failure to take account of any of these points, despite representations made on our behalf in the call for sites consultation. (see below 1-4)***
- ***The failure to provide the evidence of the SHLAA during the consultation stage CSSO despite the Council agreeing to release the SHLAA.”***

Full details of our representations on these specific points are set out in the Annex to this PS. In addressing the points in Issue 2, the inquiry will therefore focus on the deliverability of a number of sites upon which the Council intends to rely. This in turn, impacts upon the SHLAA Trajectory and the Five Year Supply. It is disappointing that the Council have chosen not to follow a process whereby appropriate scrutiny of the scale and deliverability of sites has taken place, for if they had, we would be starting from a more certain position today. This PS will focus on the most significant shortcomings in the SHLAA which impact upon the strategic deliverability of the Plan in the City of Bath. The PS will avoid dealing with small, site specific locations, which would have been best addressed at a Stakeholder Panel, however the evidence of the past two decades suggests that the Council has not delivered against many such allocated sites, which has led to repeated shortfalls in delivery, despite the occurrence of windfalls.

Finally, many of the SHLAA housing sites are currently employment sites, large and small. There is no proper accountability as to how the Council intend to deliver upon the

employment growth strategy, that is a net increase in 5700 new jobs at Bath, while vacating employment sites in favour of housing.

Inspector's Question 3.1

The Banes housing trajectory CD4/H14 provides the evidence that the assumption that all sites with PP will come forward and deliver during the plan period. This is an unrealistic assumption.

Most significant are the assumptions based around the BWR site beyond Phase 1a, discussed below. This represents a major element of the planned delivery for Bath. There is no allowance for non-implementation and given the current economic climate, there must be considerable risk that some sites will not come forward.

The significant housing sites within the SHLAA that are not subject to extant planning permission fall into 2 categories :

1. River Corridor Sites
2. MOD sites

River Corridor Sites

Issue of deliverability of these houses, assessed to be in the region of 1252 (Sequential Test CD6/D2) is largely dependant upon:

1. Delivery of upstream compensatory storage.
2. Co-delivery of mixed use schemes involving substantive new office development, 85,000-100,000m². Much of this is dependant upon market sentiment and the burden of high infrastructure costs. To date, no schemes have come forward. Lead-in times are long and speculative office development no longer likely.
3. Re-use of locations predominantly focused towards industrial output at Twerton/Newbridge Riverside. Aside from flooding risks, the removal of these industrial sites, which provide an important element of the Bath economy, seems counter productive.
4. Re-use of land and buildings currently occupied by businesses and other activities. There is no schedule of relocation or re-establishment plans, including costs, feasibility, location and the impact upon transport/sustainability and in/out-commuting. This includes reliance on Council car parking sites in the centre for office and housing. These locations cannot be relied upon in the light of the Transport Package changes.

MOD Sites (see below)

The Trajectory (CD 4/H14) shows the spatial distribution, timing and scale of the housing over the period of the Plan, however this trajectory does not accord with the main objectives of the Plan. The broad thrust of the main spatial strategy Policy DW1, is the focus for growth at the City of Bath para 1.27 sic. "*Bath as the economic driver in the district is the primary focus for new development. The spatial strategy begins to address the existing commuting imbalance (net in-commuting) by directing more homes than jobs to the city*".

This policy approach is represented graphically by the Key Diagram, Diagram 4. The delivery of this strategy is said to entail, para 1.33, "*significant uplift in past rates of delivery from around 380 to around 550 per annum although as set out in the SHLAA, the overall trajectory of provision is determined by the performance of individual locations.*"

This policy approach also relies upon the timely delivery of new jobs with the target of 8,700 additional (net) new jobs although "*there is scope in the spatial strategy to deliver an even greater number of jobs in line with the Economic*

Strategy through smart growth and where this does not harm the District's environment" (para 1.33).

Key Diagram 4 specifically proposes 5,700 net new jobs at Bath and 6,000 new homes and Policy B1 2a proposes “*an increase in jobs at Bath from about 61,700 in 2006 to 67,400 in 2026, with significant gains in business services tempered by losses in defence and manufacturing*”.

This will be achieved by “*the net additional increase to the stock of office premises by enabling the development of 85,000-100,000m2 of new space*”.

Policy B1 2 c.

Overall the planned growth of jobs at Bath given the losses from MOD sites and manufacturing is in excess of 8,500 new jobs. Consequently there will be a need for timely delivery of these new jobs and office space with a clear alignment with the housing trajectory.

This strategy needs to be aligned with the overall objective of reducing the need to travel (SCS Driver Objective 1) and in particular of reducing the level of in-commuting to Bath.

Distribution of new homes and net additional jobs in the District:

Bath	6,000 homes	5,700 jobs
District	11,000 homes	8,700 jobs
% Bath	55%	66%

Whilst the overall housing figures as proposed by the Council, are considered by HFT to be a substantial under-provision, the impact of the planned delivery as described in the trajectory needs careful assessment to see whether it is realistic and whether it will meet the objectives, as well as the policies of the plan.

The delivery in Bath of this district share of all new homes will demonstrate whether the Council can start to address its key objective of sustainable economic growth with reduced in-commuting.

	CS Target Bath	CS Target District	% Bath	Trajectory Bath 1.	Trajectory Bath 2.	Trajectory Bath 3.	Trajectory Not in Bath 4.
2006 -2011	1500	2750	55	32%*	59%*	86%*	
2011-2016	1500	2750	55	36%	66%	94%	
2016-2021	1500	2750	55	48%	88%	125%	
2021-2026	1500	2750	55	56%	100%	100%	

* *Actual Performance*

Notes

- *1. % of district target*
- *2. Performance against total district target (cumulative)*
- *3. Performance against target for Bath (cumulative)*
- *4. Performance against target for all sites outside Bath (cumulative)*

The above data taken from the SHLAA shows how housing delivery in Bath lags behind the CS Target of 55%, until the period 2021-2026. This reflects how constrained the delivery of sites in Bath is, compared to the other locations in the district.

This is similar to historic trends and is reflected in a shortfall or backlog in housing from the period up to 2006, of 850 homes. This backlog is not addressed in this trajectory and is therefore a significant omission.

In contrast, delivery performance outside of Bath remains high and close to CS target levels. By 2016-2021 the delivery in Keysham, Somer Valley and rural areas exceeds the cumulative target figure by 25%.

Although there is no jobs trajectory published, the proposed distribution of jobs set out below, reflects the fact that 'Bath is the economic driver in the district'. The Plan proposes a total of 8700 net new jobs across the whole district distributed as follows:

	2006 -2026		
	Target Net Jobs	% Split	Jobs/pa
Bath	5,700	66%	285
Somer Valley	1,000	11%	50
Keysham	1,500	17%	75
Rural	500	6%	25
Total	8,700	100%	

For the purposes of a jobs trajectory HFT have assumed constant economic growth across the period of the Plan to give an avg. jobs/pa across the district.

	SHLAA Trajectory			SHLAA Trajectory		
	Homes Bath	Cum.Homes Bath	Jobs Bath**	Homes Not in Bath	Cumul Homes Not in Bath	Jobs Not in Bath
2006 -2011	886	886	1425	1081	1081	750
2011-2016	1114	2000	2850	2232	3313	1500
2016-2021	1991	3993	4275	1383	4696	2250
2021-2026	2231	6224	5700	304	5000	3000

** Net additional jobs

This Table shows the imbalance of jobs and homes that the SHLAA Trajectory is proposing. In essence, the planned growth in homes elsewhere in the district outside of Bath, outstrips local jobs supply by a factor of 2 to 1 by 2016. In Bath, over the same period, the opposite is occurring, that is jobs growth outstripping housing growth. The net effect will be increased in-migration pressures into the City of Bath. In practice the situation could get even worse in Bath, as net additional jobs account for a further 2,800-3,000 new jobs, to redress MOD losses and reduction in manufacturing. Some of these additional new jobs will be taken up by the new labour force, resident outside of Bath.

The situation remains similar up to 2021, where new homes outside Bath outstrip local supply by a factor in excess of 2 to 1, whilst new jobs/homes surplus remains in Bath.

Only when the Plan is in its final five years will the level of growth provide an appropriate balance between jobs and homes in Bath, according to this SHLAA trajectory. In reality this is incorrect, the level of gross or additional new jobs (8,500+) at 2026, will continue to exceed the proposed level of housing, requiring a continuing growth in in-commuting to the City.

Reflecting upon the key locations identified in the SHLAA for the City of Bath, the Plan has little by way of any flexibility to address slippage, obstacles to delivery and viability. As a characteristic of brownfield sites is often uncertainty, the reliance in this SHLAA Trajectory upon so many difficult sites to deliver a level of housing growth never seen before in Bath, must call the soundness of the Plan into question.

Uncertainties remain over the deliver of BWR both in terms of site development constraints, land assembly and viability. This trajectory assumes delivery of up to 200 homes/pa for 15 years, to 2026.

Elsewhere, development upon the River Corridor Flood Plain will require Upstream Compensation Storage to be delivered by 2016, thereby allowing the SHLAA Trajectory to recover housing numbers from its previous decade of under provision in Bath. If there is no viable solution to address loss of flood storage capacity upstream, the under provision in Bath will continue.

Finally, the reliance upon delivery of all three MOD sites to be 'up and running' by 2016, delivering new homes, seems too optimistic and offer no flexibility within the SHLAA Trajectory.

Delivery up to 2015/16 is subject to delivering BWR Phase 2 and the resolution of the Windsor Gas Holder decommissioning. As this is not yet resolved there must be doubt about its delivery.

These also impact upon BFI Waste Systems, Argos River Frontage, as well as Bath Press Site.

Similarly uncertainties arise amongst sites noted as small sites with planning permission which account for 225 homes over 5 Years .

SHLAA Outer Bath Sites e.g. Englishcombe Lane , B18 Hayesfield Playing Fields.

Together these amount to up to 243 homes in 2015/16 (SHLAA Trajectory) . Many of these are uncertain at this stage and should not be counted.

Overall the uncertainties arising from a small number of brownfield sites in Bath could have an increasingly adverse impact on the SHLAA trajectory from 2014/15 onwards. In addition, the homes /jobs imbalance referred to above continues and gets worse as there is no flexibility to provide for alternative new homes elsewhere other than outside of Bath. 'Not in Bath Sites' are expected to be delivered at a rate of at least twice that of homes in Bath and perhaps more, if there is slippage.

A need for alternative sources of housing at Bath is therefore clearly evident. This alternative source of housing needs to be capable of being available and on stream during the period 2011-2016.

Such sources need to provide certainty over delivery i.e. not being dependant on major public investment in infrastructure or the removal of complex industrial heritage. Where possible, sources should be outside River Corridor Flood Plain and not be dependant on mixed-use office development, where economic constraints will exist. The locations must be sustainable and accessible and link well into the 'reduced' public transport system, i.e. the revised Bath Package.

Further work will be done to consider how a revised SHLAA trajectory, incorporating new housing sources at Bath, could assist in maintaining a strong jobs/ homes balance in Bath and provide greater certainty and flexibility over delivery. This work will be undertaken following analysis of the relationship between new homes at Bath and contribution to an economic workforce in the City.

Inspector's Question 3.2

Windfalls

The reliance upon windfalls in the last 4 years of the Plan, is simply finding more and more desperate means to make up the numbers for Bath.

The Plan should have a robust and flexible approach. This means provision of a larger number of deliverable sites.

The impact of reducing development in the back gardens will have a significant effect in Bath. The securing of affordable housing financial contributions on smaller sites CP9, will also have adverse impact on the number of new sites. A significant number of windfalls have also come from change of use of offices to residential in the City Centre, despite policies that seek to preserve office space (Retained Local Plan Policy). More challenging jobs growth targets in this CS will largely remove the temptation to allow such changes, against explicit plan policies.

The only justification for the inclusion windfalls in this way should be that it provides some contingency/flexibility to achieving the target provision. Windfalls should not be relied upon to deliver the target. The history of Bath is one of under-provision for decades. The evidence above shows that this shortfall in housing will continue well into the 2nd half of the Plan period and only be made up in the final 5 years of the Plan. This period will need to see housing delivery levels in Bath at their highest, 446 homes pa.

Any windfalls should be considered as bonus, on top of target housing provision.

Inspector's Question 3.3

HFT believe the calculation of the 5 Year Housing Provision as set out in SHLAA, Sect 4.0 is wrong and totally misleading.

As accepted in para 3.4, the Local Plan to 2006 has a shortfall of 850 housing units at least which should be taken up in the overall provision in the CS.

In addition, the error in calculation of the housing numbers (ratio of 1.39 , ID7 para 2.8) leads to a minimum overall figure for the district of 12,100 housing units.

Subtotal A: 12,100 units + 850 units =12,950 units.

The Council acknowledges the shortfall in delivery between 2006-2011, it refers to this figure in 4.4.1 and annualizes the figure over the remaining Plan Period. That is a 780 units shortfall /15 years = additional 52 housing units per year.

Assuming Subtotal A is correct, the adjusted shortfall during 2006-2011 is 1,207 housing units. ($5 \times (12950/20) - 1967$)

HFT do not accept the method of ‘annualized shortfall’ as proposed by the Council (para 4.4.1) but using this approach would lead to an additional requirement of 84 housing units per year or 643 per annum in total.

Adjusted 5 Year Supply: 5×643 homes = 3,215 housing units

Adjusted for NPPF para.109 : $3215 \times 120\%$ = 3,858 housing units

Conclusion: Not a 5 Year Supply of Deliverable Sites.*

The Council argue the 5 Year Deliverable Supply Figure is 3,346 homes. This is not accepted as an accurate figure and reference is made to errors or unreasonable assumptions made by the Council above. HFT will challenge this figure and demonstrate it is significantly lower.

Distribution of Housing

Distribution of the 5 Year Supply Figure across the district is relevant to the proper application of the 5 Year Supply Calculation to the policies of the CS.

The approach of the Council is to rely upon the total district supply figure involving the delivery of a large number of homes outside of Bath, to make up the Five Year Supply in 2011-2016, (1,114 homes in Bath against a total figure of 3,346). This amounts to approximately 33% of the 5 Year Supply figure, compared with the CS target of at least 55% in the City of Bath. The approach runs contrary to the objectives of the Plan and will result in unsustainable patterns of movement.

The results are similar to the SHLAA trajectory (see 3.1 above) which shows how the spatial distribution of housing supply is reliant on delivery outside of Bath during the first half of the Plan.

A more accurate ‘adjusted’ 5 Year Supply Figure should be provided by Council which accords with the objectives and policies of the CS. Such evidence needs to reflect more accurately the timing and the spatial distribution of homes across the district over the Five Year Supply period.

HFT believe the outcome of such an exercise will show a much weaker Five Year Supply position than the Council is currently reporting, providing further evidence of unsoundness.

Inspector’s Question 3.4

The need to provide a robust Plan of sufficient duration is essential. The Plan should provide for 15 Years from Adoption. The reality of this Plan is that there is very little flexibility or contingency to address needs beyond that which the Council are proposing. This CS assumes that delivery is achievable on all sites, which is considered unrealistic.

The ‘world does not stop at 2026 in Bath’ to quote EiP Panel Inspector in 2006. If the evidence of need, taken with the strategies for delivery, means that the Plan needs to consider its capacity to deliver longer term, then the Plan should be realistic and consider a minimum of 15 Years.

The consequence of this approach, suggests that the needs are greater than the Plan is providing for. It would therefore be wrong to foreshorten the Plan in order to provide a 'tidy, political fit'.

Issue 2 Bath Spatial Area

Inspectors Question 4.1

The delivery of the planned housing for Bath requires consideration of:

- the overall scale of housing numbers and whether this is adequate.
- the timing or phasing of that housing delivery compared to the overall strategy.
- the planned housing numbers likely to be delivered during the Plan period.
- the type and nature of that planned housing in order to satisfy the objectives of the Plan.

The adequacy of the planned housing numbers is addressed in the PS Issue 1 and the submission by Baker Associates. As it is our position that substantially more houses are needed in Bath than currently provided in this Plan, it follows that the Plan as drafted, will fail to deliver adequate housing.

The timing or phasing of housing delivery is discussed in PS Issue 2 SHLAA. We conclude that the planned delivery as set out in the SHLAA Trajectory will provide a continued shortfall in housing to the City of Bath up until 2021. The planned provision of most housing outside of Bath during this period, will increase in-commuting to the City, contrary to the objectives of the Plan. The overall delivery to achieve the planned housing numbers in Bath is loaded to the end of the Plan period. The Plan has no flexibility to allow other locations in the City to come forward and address the growing shortfall and if such sites encounter technical difficulties the Plan will not be capable of delivery.

Considering the deliverability of the strategic sites in the Bath, we have already touched upon the difficulties of those broad locations in the River Corridor dependant upon 'upstream flood compensation' and upon the significance of this. It is our view that this alone is sufficient to make the CS unsound, especially as there is no flexibility to provide alternative supply.

Turning to the delivery of other significant locations in the CS, ref. Policy B1 3a Housing, the BWR site and the MOD sites make up the majority of new planned housing of approximately 3,500-4,000 homes. Given the significance of these sites, they also have a substantive contribution to make to affordable housing delivery in Bath (Policy CP9 states that "*an average affordable housing contribution percentage of 35% will be sought on these large development sites*"). HFT will point out in its PS on Affordable Housing, that BWR will fall well short of this policy requirement with major consequences for affordable housing delivery.

As described below, there are considerable technical and assembly problems associated with BWR site, which make the assumptions in the SHLAA Trajectory unreliable.

Inspectors Question 4.2 /4.3

Bath Western Riverside BWR

Rep. HFT 3 to the dCS addressed a potentially significant impediment to the delivery of BWR beyond Phase 1a. This threatens the delivery of over 2,000 houses at the site, despite the grant of Outline Consent on 23/12/2010. The location of the Windsor Gas Holder within the BWR site means that no residential development can take place within the zoned areas covering most of the BWR site.

The reality of the Windsor Gas Holder, was that it was largely ignored by Council officers when reporting upon the planning applications in 2010 and publishing the SHLAA in Dec 2011 (CD4/H6).

A revision to the SHLAA May 2011 (CDH4/H13) provided a more detailed assessment of the BWR site, ref. WES1. Again the SHLAA report was silent upon the fundamental constraints imposed by the hazardous Gas Holder facility. This approach to SHLAA evidence is symptomatic of the Council's lack of openness based upon a fundamental objective to avoid the use of Green Belt locations at all cost.

The assumption of the SHLAA and its Trajectory and of Policies DW1 and B1 is that there is no impediment to continuous year on year housing delivery upon the BWR site for the period between 2011-2026, amounting to 2,281 homes. HFT do not consider the evidence supports this ambitious claim for the following reasons:

1. The site, the subject of the Outline Consent, remains in multiple ownership with little evidence that land assembly can be secured. The parties to the S.106 Agreement remain as Crest, Wessex Water and the Council only. No other landowners are bound by the agreement.

2. The majority of the site is sterilized by the Windsor Gas Holder and this remains an impediment to remaining phases. Solutions to removing the Gas Holder will be complex and expensive. (Retail solutions on the nearby Bath Press Site may assist). This will impact on the deliverability of the site.

3. Parts of the site outside the ownership of Crest and the Council, in the vicinity of the Gas Holders are heavily contaminated. The extent of the contamination and the cost of treatment have not been determined however residential development may not be viable.

4. The BWR site Phase 1a has been the subject of substantial public subsidy to address infrastructure costs and the provision of affordable housing. There is risk that future public funding may not be available for subsequent phases.

5. The terms for the provision of affordable housing on the BWR site, which is said to be 25% of all housing in accordance with the Affordable Housing Scheme dated 23/12/10, is likely to be unviable unless it is supported by huge public subsidy. The uncertainty over the provision of funding for affordable housing beyond Phase 1a must therefore be a major impediment to delivery of this site. Reference will be made to the Affordable Housing Scheme which is signed by Crest, the Council and Somer Housing (Annex 2).

The Council has failed to show in their infrastructure delivery plans how it intends to fund the delivery of affordable housing on the site, given the costs set out in the Affordable Housing Scheme.

The Council has now included reference to remediation issues upon the site and the need for decommissioning of the Windsor Gas Holders, PC20 etc. However there is no acknowledgement of other potential impediments that may impact on delivery, which are referred to above, despite the Council having detailed knowledge of these issues.

The detailed questions raised by the Inspector in Question 4.3 have as yet to be answered by the Council, however HFT may wish to respond to any new evidence presented by the Council but in the meantime, the lack of such evidence calls into question deliverability of BWR, which goes to the soundness of the Plan.

In the case of BWR, this seems all too little, too late. The location is well known to the Council having been allocated for mixed-use development in the Local Plan, been the subject of a comprehensive SPD, as well as outline and full planning applications lodged in 2006. It is an indication of how complex delivery of these brownfield sites are within the River Corridor and how delivery is less certain now, than it was at the time of the Local Plan in 2006.

Inspector's Questions 4.4/4.5/4.6/4.7

The matters raised by the Inspector are addressed elsewhere in PS by HFT. In some cases, HFT will be submitting more representations to the Inspector, as the Council discloses new evidence to support their case for deliverability. As we have said before, the approach of this Council to preparation of the SHLAA has not been in accordance with CLG Good Practice Guidance and consequently will be subject to scrutiny only at the inquiry stage.

Inspector's Questions 4.8

MoD Land

The MoD statement makes clear the planned disposal of the three sites at Bath, with the Ensleigh Site being vacated in 2018.

Proposed Changes PC18/34 suggest that the scale of the housing development at these sites may be increased by up to 300 units (~~2500~~-2800 units in Suburban Bath) .

The issues for the purposes of the CS are the timing and the scale of development at the locations and whether there are particular infrastructure costs that might impact on delivery.

The level of housing in the SHLAA Trajectory is approximately 1,190 homes on all three sites. We suggest that this represents a maximum figure as the computation in the SHLAA assumes a net to gross ratio (whole site area) of 0.8, which is extremely optimistic and in contrast to the approach taken by the Council on the Green Belt locations i.e. Sulis Down, where the Gross Area is taken as approx. 75% of the site, with buffer zones against the adjoining Green Belt/AONB Boundary, the setting of the Conservation Area, the SAM and a conservative allowance for land stability.

Although land stability due to past undermining at Foxhill may be a risk, there is no allowance taken into account in the computation of net developable area.

PC18/34 suggests an even higher delivery rate of 1,490 units at all three sites, with no substantive evidence to justify this.

There has been no assessment of the needs for on site facilities at the larger locations, i.e. Primary School, community facilities shops etc. Neither location at Foxhill or Ensleigh is well served with local facilities or with good transport links, albeit there is a local centre at Bradford Road.

At present, the three sites directly employ over 2,800 staff, with many other indirect jobs located in the vicinity. The Local Plan proposed mixed use development on the sites however this CS is planning almost entirely residential development, with the SHLAA proposing up to 1.0 ha for employment uses.

Finally, the SHLAA trajectory proposes that all three locations will come on stream in 2016, to make a significant contribution to the Bath over the following

10 years. The trajectory suggests that the first year will be the largest contribution of 167 units/pa, reducing to 100-140 units in subsequent years. We do not believe this is credible given the plans for disposal by the MoD and the continued occupation of at least one site until 2018.

The planned disposal process as set out in the MoD Document Oct 2011 will take some time to conclude, 2012/2013 estimated.

Therefore whilst it is accepted that the MoD sites will come forward during the period of the CS and make a significant contribution to the housing delivery, there can be no certainty that the scale and the timing will match that set out in the SHLAA. A more conservative approach should therefore be applied to these locations and flexibility found within the delivery at alternative locations. Without this, the continued shortfall in housing at Bath will be maintained in the second half of the CS period, with consequences for the economy and sustainability, i.e. increased in-commuting.

The largest site at Foxhill may contain substantive risks due to land stability and undermining, which is accepted in the SHLAA. This needs to be confirmed before the location can be considered deliverable in the SHLAA.

Inspector's Question 4.9

There appears to be no real scope for the MoD sites or for the River Corridor locations to be used as contingency sites. The CS proposes maximizing development through housing on most of these sites, as reflected in the SHLAA and its trajectory. The likelihood is that there will be a need for contingency specifically because of a delay or impediments that result from these brownfield sites.

'Flexibility in the nature, density and mix of uses' (DW1) is completely meaningless and because of the lack of availability of alternative sites in the CS, the exact opposite is the case.

Cl. 1.36 refers to an early review in 2016, in response to monitoring delivery rates, however the SHLAA trajectory is so low in the City of Bath 2011-2016, that there will be little response to monitoring delivery.

Inspector's Question 4.10/4.11

As referred to in the SHLAA Trajectory (3.1 above) the overall plan to secure a net increase of 5,700 new jobs, means that actual jobs growth will be 8,500 jobs at Bath. This growth in jobs that has continued since 2001, has seen a net increase in jobs to Bath equivalent to 600 jobs/pa. During this time new housing in Bath has barely met 50% of this growth figure, with a consequential rise in in-commuting (see Baker's Report Feb 2011, PS1).

The delivery of homes in Bath will fail to keep pace with jobs growth to 2016 and beyond with self-containment getting worse. The B1 2 e policy for reduction in industrial space has been subject to proposed change i.e. a reduction from 40,000m² to 30,000m² but this is insufficient.

Newbridge /Riverside

Inspector's Questions 4.12,4.13, 4.14, 4.15

Sadly, the Council's most successful economic strategy (in terms of achieving its target) continues to be the contraction of industrial, including manufacturing, floor space. This strategy, which is set out in the Local Plan 2007, is recorded in the AMR. The City contains a multi-skilled workforce with many successful businesses with international markets, for example Rotork, Cross Engineering. The proposals in para. 2 e of Policy

B1 to plan to further run down industrial land by 40,000 m² (now 30,000m²) over the period to 2026 seems perverse and will continue to discourage economic investment in this area. Not all new jobs will be office based in the future and therefore the CS should emphasize the desire for a mixed/balanced economy. The Policy wording, as amplified in Policy B3, suggests that retention of the Newbridge Riverside Area is the CS's future response to industrial floor space. However this area has also been identified as 'a contingency area' (Policy DW1, B3, see objections/ reps) for non-economic development uses i.e. residential, mixed use, which will be 'welcomed' by the Council.

This has been subject to Proposed Changes (PC31) part of which are welcomed, however the Proposed Changes go on to suggest that Twerton Riverside can in time accommodate mixed-use development and thereby become some sort of contingency. This muddled approach, which is more about trying to prevent any urban extension to Bath, will serve only to undermine the economic base of this area in the future, through lack of support for employment investment contrary to the objectives of the Economic Strategy for B&NES 2010-2026, which seeks to 'protect and retain manufacturing space within Bath'.

The Action Plan from the Economic Strategy provides practical advice to the Council when drawing up the CS. This seems to have been ignored. At page 45, "*Improving the availability of business premises*" the text states: "*Growth in the above targeted sectors will only occur on the scale required if businesses have the space to move into and grow.....This space must be appropriate for, and attractive to, those types of business we wish to grow locally. For example, space for arts and creative businesses can be more informal, industrial, or "second hand". Industrial and workshop space will be essential for advanced engineering , high-value manufacturing and businesses developing new technologies*".

Policy B1 and particularly para 2, fails to recognise the importance of this element of employment in the City, given the skills base that exists locally and the ignoring priorities set out in para 4 a & b of the same policy. That is "*Achieve better balance.....Economic diversification will reduce the need for a significant minority of resident workers to out-commute to other areas.*" Such an approach undermines the Core Objectives of the CS, 1, 3 and 7 which will lead to more unsustainable patterns of commuting. The policy wording of para. 2 e should be amended by the deletion of the strategy to contract the floorspace by 40,00m³ (PC 30,000m²) and to try to retain industrial/ manufacturing space as part of the mixed economy, including in areas such as Newbridge Riverside. The proposed amended wording to Policy 2 e forms part of HFT 3, para 7b 3. **It is therefore HFT's position that the overall strategy of further running down industrial land capacity in Bath is unsound given the need for such space, the local work force and skills and the business success. This requires alteration to Policy B1 2 e to make it sound.**

The broad locational strategy behind Policy B1 is understandable as it seeks to prioritise brownfield land in the city centre and along the river corridor, where possible regeneration opportunities will attempt to deliver the broad spatial strategy of Policy B2., that is 85,000-100,000m² of new office space and 3500 new homes. This strategy is at the heart of the Council's economic delivery plan. It represents approx 100% of the new planned employment space and 58% of the new homes for the City as determined by the Council and therefore is fundamental to success of the CS. The Policies to deliver this strategy in addition to B1 are, Policy B2 Central Area Strategic Policy (see reps

Part 5) , 53 Twerton and Newbridge Riverside Strategic Policy (see ips Part 6) Key Diagrams 5-9 (see Reps HFT 2,4).

In so far as all of these policies seek to deliver between 2011 -2026, at least 85,000-100,000m² of new office space and 3500 new homes, it is vital to consider their soundness that is to say; are they justified and/or effective.

Alongside this, the Council should maintain their existing stock of industrial land as it represents the most sustainable location for this type of development. Most of the sites at Newbridge and Twerton Riverside lie within Flood Zone 3 and as such are less vulnerable to flooding risk than other uses, ie residential. As a possible contingency location, Twerton Riverside has a limited role.

Twerton and Newbridge should remain as locations for industrial use and the Council should provide appropriate investment to encourage the objectives of the Economic Strategy 2010-2026. The suggestion that this part of the economy is somehow not 'Smart Growth' is not sound. Modest investment from the Council would probably deliver more jobs in this area in the short term, than seeking extensive office development on difficult sites in the River Corridor. In reality, the Council need a more balanced approach to the economy and jobs growth, which allows investment to be encouraged in most sectors.